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KITZMILLER AND THE "IS IT SCIENCE?"
QUESTION
JAY D. WEXLER *

INTRODUCTION
When Judge John E. Jones, III, a United States District Court
judge appointed by President George W. Bush, ruled that the Dover
school board's intelligent design (ID) policy1 violated the Establishment

*

Associate Professor, Boston University School of Law. The author would

like to thank participants and attendees of the First Amendment Law Review's
symposium of which this article was a part for very helpful questions and comments
on the argument contained below. The piece also benefited from questions and
comments received at the American Association for the Advancement of Science's
2006 Annual Meeting in St. Louis, as well as in connection with a presentation at the
Boisi Center for Religion and American Public Life at Boston College. Finally,
special thanks to Dan Blau, whose terrific suggestions and expert editing of the piece
improved it enormously.
1. Dover's policy had two relevant parts. First, the school board passed a
resolution stating that: "Students will be made aware of gaps/problems in Darwin's
theory and of other theories of evolution including, but not limited to, intelligent
design. Note: Origins of Life is not taught." Second, the school district announced
that students in ninth grade biology classes would be read the following statement:
The Pennsylvania Academic Standards require
students to learn about Darwin's Theory of Evolution and
eventually to take a standardized test of which evolution is
a part.
Because Darwin's Theory is a theory, it continues to
be tested as new evidence is discovered. The Theory is not
a fact. Gaps in the Theory exist for which there is no
evidence. A theory is defined as a well-tested explanation
that unifies a broad range of observations.
Intelligent Design is an explanation of the origin of
life that differs from Darwin's view. The reference book,
Of Pandas and People, is available for students who might
be interested in gaining an understanding of what
Intelligent Design actually involves.
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Clause, ID opponents were ecstatic.3 They had good reason to be. The
opinion was a comprehensive and complete victory for ID opponents.
The decision held that the policy was an unconstitutional endorsement of
religion when viewed both from a reasonable Dover student's
perspective 4 as well as from the perspective of a reasonable adult in the
Dover community. 5 It also held that the policy was adopted for a
religious purpose, 6 therefore failing the Supreme Court's longstanding
three-part Lemon test. 7 And if finding the policy unconstitutional for at
least three independent reasons was not enough, the judge also concluded
that ID was not science, 8 cast doubt on the school board's truthfulness
and ethics at the trial, 9 and declared that the policy represented
"breathtaking inanity."' 0 In short, the decision was a slam dunk for ID
opponents.
As someone who has been arguing for nearly a decade that
teaching ID in the public schools would be constitutionally
problematic," I, too, was delighted by Judge Jones' opinion. The
With respect to any theory, students are encouraged
to keep an open mind. The school leaves the discussion of
the Origins of Life to individual students and their families.
As a Standards-driven district, class instruction focuses
upon preparing students to achieve proficiency on
Standards-based assessments.
Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 708-09 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
2. Id.at 709.
3. See infra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
4. Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 724, 729.
5. Id. at 734.
6. Id.at 762-63.
7. Id.at 763-64. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971)
(holding that in order for a statute to comply with the Establishment Clause, "[flirst,
the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary
effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute
must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion."' (citation
omitted) (alteration added)).
8. See Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 735-46.
9. See id at 752, 756, 765.
10. Id.at 765 ("The breathtaking inanity of the Board's decision is evident
when considered against the factual backdrop which has now been fully revealed
through this trial.").
11. My first article on the subject appeared in 1997. See Jay D. Wexler, Note,
Of Pandas, People, and the First Amendment: The Constitutionality of Teaching
IntelligentDesign in the Public Schools, 49 STAN. L. REv. 439 (1997).
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opinion is clear, painstakingly documented, and, in my view, somewhere
around 95% correct. Judge Jones' determination to employ the
endorsement test, when the Supreme Court has not directly used that test
in similar circumstances, was the right legal choice in a jurisprudential
area of great ambiguity. His application of that test was extremely
careful and persuasive. 12 Further, his decision to consider the Lemon test
after he had already invalidated the policy on endorsement grounds was
likewise shrewd and helped ensure that the decision would have
withstood appellate review, had the school board chosen to take the case
to the Third Circuit. The decision is also filled with insightful
observations and details that indicate Judge Jones gave the issue an
enormous amount of thought and consideration, and that he understood
the issues presented by the case with sophistication and depth. My
personal favorite on this score is the footnote in which Judge Jones
makes fast work of the Board's argument that reading a brief disclaimer
in the classroom is not in fact "teaching." 13 As Jones rightly points out,
practically everything that happens in a school classroom can be
understood as teaching in the relevant sense, and reading
a short
14
statement about evolution and its alternatives is no exception.
Given the quality of the opinion, why do I believe that the
decision was only somewhere around 95% correct? The opinion's main
flaw lies in the conclusion with which most ID opponents were
particularly pleased-namely, the judge's finding that ID is not science.
I take this position, I hasten to add, not because I necessarily think that
ID is science. As someone who is neither a scientist nor a philosopher of

12. My own view, which I have repeatedly set out elsewhere, is that teaching
ID in the public school classroom would, under most circumstances, result in an
endorsement of religion. See, e.g., Jay D. Wexler, Intelligent Design and the First
Amendment: A Response, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 63 (2006); Jay D. Wexler, Darwin,
Design, and Disestablishment: Teaching the Evolution Controversy in Public

Schools, 56

VAND.

L. REV. 751 (2003); Wexler, Of Pandas,People, and the First

Amendment, supra note 11.

13. Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 727 n.7 ("Dr. Alters, the District's own
science teachers, and Plaintiffs Christy Rehm and Steven Stough, who are
themselves teachers, all made it abundantly clear by their testimony that an educator
reading the disclaimer is engaged in teaching, even if it is colossally bad
teaching. .

.

. The

disclaimer

is

a

'mini-lecture'

providing

substantive

misconceptions about the nature of science, evolution, and ID which 'facilitates
learning."' (citations omitted)).
14. Id.
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science, I do not know if ID is science. But the important issue for
evaluating the decision is not whether ID actually is science-a question
that sounds in philosophy of science-but rather whether judges should
be deciding in their written opinions that ID is or is not science as a
matter of law. On this question, I think.the answer is "no," particularly
when the overall question posed to a court is whether teaching ID
endorses religion, not whether ID is or is not science.15 The part of
Kitzmiller that finds ID not to be science is unnecessary, unconvincing,
not particularly suited to the judicial role, and even perhaps dangerous
both to science and to freedom of religion.
Part I of this short Essay briefly reviews what the Kitzmiller
opinion says about ID's status as non-science. Part II argues that the
opinion would have been better without this controversial finding.
I. WHAT THE OPINION SAYS

Judge Jones devotes close to a fifth of his opinion to the question
of whether ID constitutes science. Prior to embarking upon his
discussion, the judge prefaces his analysis with this paragraph:
We have now found that both an objective student
and an objective adult member of the Dover
community would perceive Defendants' conduct to
be a strong endorsement of religion pursuant to the
endorsement test. Having so concluded, we find it
incumbent upon the Court to further address an
additional issue raised by Plaintiffs, which is
whether ID is science. To be sure, our answer to
this question can likely be predicted based upon the
foregoing analysis. While answering this question
compels us to revisit evidence that is entirely
complex, if not obtuse, after a six week trial that
spanned twenty-one days and included countless
hours of detailed expert witness presentations, the
Court is confident that no other tribunal in the
United States is in a better position than are we to
traipse into this controversial area. Finally, we will
15. I first made this point in 1997. See Wexler, Of Pandas, People, and the
FirstAmendment, supra note 11, at 466-68.
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offer our conclusion on whether ID is science not
just because it is essential to our holding that an
Establishment Clause violation has occurred in this
.case, but also in the hope that it may prevent the
obvious waste of judicial and other resources
which would be occasioned by a subsequent trial
16
involving the precise question which is before us.
Beginning his substantive discussion of why ID is not science,
Judge Jones observes that there are at least three, perhaps four,
independent reasons why he reaches his conclusion. Noting that "ID
fails on three different levels, any one of which is sufficient to preclude a
determination that ID is science,"' 7 he lists the following rationales:
(1) ID violates the centuries-old ground rules of
science by invoking and permitting supernatural
causation; (2) the argument of irreducible
complexity, 18 central to ID, employs the same
flawed and illogical contrived dualism that doomed
creation science in the 1980s; and (3) ID's negative
attacks on evolution 9have been refuted by the
scientific community.'
The judge goes on to note that ID's failure to gain any
acceptance among scientists or to make any inroads into peer-reviewed

16. Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 734-35.
17. Id. at 735.

18. According to the opinion, Behe's definition of "irreducible complexity" is
as follows:
By irreducibly complex I mean a single system which is
composed of several well-matched, interacting parts that
contribute to the basic function, wherein the removal of any
one of the parts causes the system to effectively cease
functioning. An irreducibly complex system cannot be
produced directly by slight, successive modifications of a
precursor system, because any precursor to an irreducibly
complex system that is missing a part is by definition
nonfunctional ....
Id. at 739 (quoting and paraphrasing Michael Behe, Reply to My Critics:A Response

to Reviews of Darwin's Black Box: The Biochemical Challenge to Evolution, 16
BIOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY 685, 694-95 (Nov. 2001)).
19. Id.at 735.
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literature is "additionally important to note. '' 20 It is unclear, however,
whether these failures constitute a fourth independent reason (or reasons)
for rejecting ID as science.
The discussion that follows this introductory paragraph proceeds
roughly in the order of the three or four listed rationales, but it is
somewhat jumbled and indeed offers more than just these three or four
rationales for rejecting ID as science. For instance, in his discussion of
the first rationale, Judge Jones analyzes ID's failure to follow the
traditional and conventional "ground rules" of science by relying on nontestable and non-natural explanations for observed data. 21 He also
observes, however, that major scientific organizations, such as the
National Academy of Science and the American Association for the
Advancement of Science, have concluded that ID is not science because
22
(among other things) it does not rely on natural explanations, a point
that seems somewhat different than the main one. The judge's treatment
23
of the second and third factors is similarly unclear.

20. Id.
at 735-37.
21. See id.
at 737-38.
22. See id.
23. In its treatment of the second point, the discussion veers somewhat
chaotically. It starts by reiterating the false dichotomy point that discrediting
evolution is not the same as proving ID. See id.at 738. But, it also critiques the
merits of Michael Behe's irreducible complexity theory at length, id at 739-41, and
then rejects, as resting on a flawed analogy of human design to supernatural design,
ID's "positive argument" that "[w]e infer design when we see parts that appear to be
arranged for a purpose." Id.at 741 (alteration added).
In its discussion of the third rationale-that ID's attacks against evolution have
been rejected by the scientific community-the opinion first claims that the
consensus of scientists have rejected ID, id.at 743, and then it points out specific
problems with the way that Of Pandas and People, the ID textbook at issue in the
case, presents and critiques particular evolutionary claims involving the fossil
record, homology, and the like. Id. at 743-44. Finally, citing testimony presented at
trial, the opinion observes that "[a] final indicator of how ID has failed to
demonstrate scientific warrant is the complete absence of peer-reviewed publications
supporting the theory." Id.at 744 (alteration added). In sum, the judge observes that
"[a]fier this searching and careful review of ID as espoused by its proponents, as
elaborated upon in submissions to the Court, and as scrutinized over a six week trial,
we find that ID is not science and cannot be adjudged a valid, accepted scientific
theory .. " Id. at 745 (alteration added).
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II. WHY ID OPPONENTS SHOULD THINK TWICE BEFORE APPLAUDING

As I observed previously, ID opponents were thrilled to read the
section of the opinion concluding ID is not science. I think it is fair to
say that these opponents were fairly confident that the challengers were
going to win the suit, but they had no idea how broad the ruling was
going to be or whether the opinion would cast doubt on ID's scientific
validity.
When the opinion was issued, evolutionists cheered its
thoroughgoing critique of ID as science. For example, the National
Science Teachers Association released a statement saying, "This is a
great day for science education .... Judge Jones's decision will echo far
beyond Pennsylvania because . . . his comprehensive and detailed
opinion.., provides great clarity that ID is not science and has no place
in science instruction., 24 Likewise, Anthony Romero, the Executive
Director of the ACLU, praised the opinion's scientific conclusions as
well as its legal conclusions when he stated, "We are extremely pleased
that 'intelligent design' is not science and that it
that the court recognizedS ,,,25
These reactions were unsurprising, given
also is not constitutional.
that ID opponents have long argued that ID is not science. Hearing an
objective and presumably conservative member of the legal
establishment with real authority pronounce the same conclusion was
surely music to the ears of many ID opponents.
It is difficult, at least on a visceral level, for an ID opponent such
as myself to disagree with these sentiments. But I want to suggest here
that ID opponents should not be overly hasty to praise Judge Jones'
discussion of the "is it science?" question. Although nearly all of the
particulars that the judge points to in his discussion (the lack of peer
review, the scientific critiques of irreducible complexity, etc.) are

24. Press Release, National Science Teachers Association, NSTA Hails Dover
Court Decision Supporting Quality Science for Students of Dover, PA (Dec. 21,
2005), http://www.nsta.org/pressroom&news_storyID=51419.
25. Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Applauds Decision

in "Intelligent Design" Case, (Dec. 20, 2005), http://www.aclu.org/religion/schools/
23144prs20051220.html. For a collection of statements issued in favor of the
opinion, see Praise for the Kitzmiller Verdict (Dec. 22, 2005),

http://www.ncseweb.org/resources/news/2005/PA/316_praise for-the-emkitzmiller
12_22_2005.asp.
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relevant to a proper endorsement analysis, it is far from clear that the
judge should have engaged in the "is it science?" inquiry. As I will
suggest in the following paragraphs, this section of the opinion in fact
suffers from a number of flaws, including that it is irrelevant to the legal
issue presented, unnecessary in any event, beyond the proper judicial
role, unexplained, and perhaps even dangerous to both religion and
science.
A. The "Is it Science?" Issue is Irrelevant.
First, and most importantly, the science versus non-science issue
is simply not relevant to the ultimate question of ID's constitutionality.
The question posed by the Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme
Court, is only whether the policy endorses religion,27 not whether the
policy teaches, promotes, or endorses science. One might reply here that
if some idea or theory is not science, then it must be religion, and thus
answering the science question will also answer the religion question.
This position, however, is flawed. For one thing, the idea or theory at
issue (here, ID) could also be part of some third area of knowledge, such
as philosophy or ideology. And even if the choice is really between
religion and science, is it truly the case that if something is in some sense
scientific then teaching it cannot constitute an endorsement of religion?
Does the cloak of science automatically protect an idea from
constitutional infirmity? If ID were science, in some nominal sense,
would that mean that public schools necessarily could teach it, regardless
of how strongly teaching it might send a religious message? The issue is
not one that courts have addressed directly, but I think the best answer is
that whether an idea qualifies as science should not be considered
particularly relevant with respect to whether teaching the idea may also
endorse religion.

26. I point to similar factors in my own endorsement analysis. See Wexler,
12, at 799-829.

Darwin, Design, and Disestablishment,supra note

27. To be clear, the Establishment Clause prohibits public schools from
teaching any particular religious viewpoint as the truth; it does not prohibit schools
from teaching about religion. Indeed, schools should teach far more about religion
than they currently do. For an extended discussion of this point, see generally Jay D.
Wexler, Preparingfor the Clothed Public Square: Teaching About Religion, Civic
Education, andthe Constitution, 43 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1159 (2002).
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This conclusion follows from the notion that endorsement is
necessarily a fact-intensive inquiry that considers the entire
circumstances surrounding a government action or policy. 28 At most,

only one of those many circumstances will relate to whether the action
involves science, and it is certainly possible that other considerations
could combine to cause observers to perceive a religious message
regardless of whether the content of the message is itself somehow
scientific. What if, for example, a scientist performed a study indicating
that there is at least some scientific support for the idea that people are
reincarnated after death? Despite the study, many people would likely
continue to believe that human beings are not reincarnated and that
reincarnation is in fact a religious belief espoused by some religious
traditions but not others. Would the existence of this one study allow
schools to teach reincarnation as fact, even if most reasonable people still
view the idea as religious? Does a certain belief cease being religious as
soon as science steps into the picture, no matter how slightly? This
hypothetical suggests the answer is "no. 29
.But perhaps this example seems too far-fetched. Consider
another, perhaps more likely, scenario. Some existing studies suggest
that people who pray are healthier than people who do not pray, and that
those who pray recover from illnesses more quickly than those who do
not pray. 30 While there is evidence that these studies may be flawed, 31 it
nonetheless seems clear that, by collecting and analyzing real-world data,
28. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 630 (1989)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[T]he 'history and ubiquity' of a practice is relevant
because it provides part of the context in which a reasonable observer evaluates
whether a challenged governmental practice conveys a message of endorsement of
religion." (alteration added)).
29. It might be the case that over time, if a concept that currently sounds in
religion were to gain increasing, perhaps overwhelming, scientific support, it might
at some point sound primarily in science rather than in religion. At that point,
perhaps the concept could be taught in the public schools without violating the
Establishment Clause.
30. See, e.g., Amy L. Ai, Ruth E. Dunkle, Christopher Peterson, & Steven F.
Bolling, The Role of PrivatePrayer in PsychologicalRecovery Among Mid-life and
Aged Patients Following Cardiac Surgery, 38 THE GERONTOLOGIST 591, 591-601

(1998). There have also been studies showing that people heal more quickly when
others pray for them. See Rob Stein, Researchers Look at Prayer and Healing;
Conclusions and PremisesDebatedas Big Study's Release Nears, WASH. POST,Mar.
24, 2006, at Al.
31. Stein, supra note 30, at Al (pointing out critiques of prayer studies).
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the studies can lay at least some claim to being scientific. Does the
status of these studies as science mean that public schools can urge
students to pray, as a way of improving their health and happiness, just
as those schools currently urge their students to stop smoking or to eat
their vegetables? Can those same public schools actually lead their
students in prayer, just as they lead their students in exercise during gym
class? I think the answer to these questions is self-evidently "no. 32 The
reason that schools cannot teach students to pray or lead them in prayer,
despite studies showing the health benefits of prayer, however, is not
because those studies are not in some sense science, but rather because
teaching students to pray (or leading them in prayer) endorses and
promotes religion.
The question for ID, as it is for prayer, should be whether a
policy introducing ID into the classroom constitutes an endorsement of
religion. As the judge correctly concluded in Kitzmiller, teaching ID
does endorse religion. Certain factors relating to ID's lack of success in
the scientific community undeniably relate to that finding. For instance,
the ID movement's complete failure to make any headway into peer
reviewed journals and the rejection of ID by the consensus of practicing
scientists strongly demonstrates the implausibility of the claim that
schools should teach ID to inform students of the serious scientific
controversy over evolution. Judge Jones rightly emphasized these facts.
But showing that ID is unsupported by the scientific community is not
the same as saying that ID is not science. The latter claim is best left for
philosophers of science to discuss in academic journals, not for inexpert
judges to conclude in legal opinions, no matter how excellent those
opinions may otherwise be.
B. The "Is it Science?" Discussion was Unnecessary
Second, the "is it science?" discussion is unnecessary given the
logic of the Kitzmiller opinion. The judge first explained in great detail

32. Granted, the analogy to teaching ID in schools as a possible alternative to
evolution is not exact. Schools such as the ones in Dover were not seeking to urge
their students to believe in ID in the same way that these hypothetical schools are
leading their students in prayer. But the broader point remains that an idea, theory,
or concept can endorse or promote religion even if it is in some sense scientific or
finds support in science.

100
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why the policy was unconstitutional for two separate reasons: because it
would be viewed as an endorsement of religion by the students in the
classroom33 and because it would be similarly perceived by the parents in
the community.34 Later in the opinion, the judge held that the school
board's purpose of promoting religion made the policy unconstitutional
for yet a third independent reason.35 In light of these findings, the further
analysis of whether ID is or is not science simply was unnecessary.
After all, the Constitution forbids promoting religion; it says nothing
about teaching science. If the Constitution prohibited the government
from excluding anything that constitutes science from the classroom,
then of course the judge would have had to determine whether ID is
science. But since the Constitution says nothing of the sort, the judge
had no need to address -the issue. This is not to say that judges should
never address an issue that is strictly unnecessary to discuss; as I have
already mentioned, the judge's decision to address the constitutionality
of the ID policy under the Lemon test after he had already struck down
the policy under the endorsement test was a shrewd one given the
36
possibility of appeal. But in this instance, given the controversial and
difficult nature of ID, the judge would have been better off avoiding the
matter.
C. By Defining Science, the Judge Acted Beyond the JudicialRole
Third, Judge Jones acted beyond the typical judicial role by
interpreting the non-legal term "science." Judges, of course, interpret
words and phrases all the time. But this interpretation almost always (if
not always) involves terms or phrases contained in concrete legal sources
such as statutes, regulations, executive orders, or perhaps judicial
opinions from higher courts. The source of the language will always be
relevant to the method the court employs in interpreting it, and courts
have developed myriad techniques and canons for figuring out how best
to interpret the language used in these different sources. Whenever a
court interprets a term or phrase from a legal text, it defines that term or

33. Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 723-29.
34. Id. at 729-35.
35. Id. at 746-63 (holding that the school board's ID policy failed the Lemon
test).
36. See supra p. 91-92.
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phrase in a very specific context-namely, as it exists in a particular text
enacted or otherwise created by some other legal actor.
In other words, when a court defines or interprets a phrase in the
Constitution-call the phrase "X"--the court is not saying that X means
such and such in every context; it is simply saying that in this particular
constitutional provision, in light of the Framers' concerns (and other
appropriate interpretive techniques), X means such and such. For
example, if a court were to come up with a working definition of
"religion" as it is used in the First Amendment,37 the definition it
developed would only be relevant and useful for understanding the
meaning of the legal text. There is no reason to think that the definition
of "religion" settled on by a court would bear much of a resemblance to
other definitions of the term, whether those definitions be theological,
anthropological, or otherwise.38 And there is certainly no reason to think

37. See, e.g., Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1032 (3d Cir. 1981):
First, a religion addresses fundamental and ultimate
questions having to do with deep and imponderable
matters. Second, a religion is comprehensive in nature; it
consists of a belief-system as opposed to an isolated
teaching. Third, a religion often can be recognized by the
presence of certain formal and external signs.
38. For a theological definition of "religion," see RUDOLF OTro, THE IDEA
THE HOLY

5-7, 10 (2d ed. 1950):
Holiness-'the holy'-is a category of interpretation
and valuation peculiar to the sphere of religion. It . . .
remains inexpressible .

.

. in the sense that it completely

eludes apprehension in terms of concepts....
[I]t will be useful, at least for the temporary
purpose of the investigation, to invent a special term to
stand for 'the holy' minus its moral factor or 'moment,'
and, as we can now add, minus its 'rational' aspect
altogether....
...There is no religion in which it does not live as
the real innermost core, and without it no religion would be
worthy of the name.
...

I adopt a word coined from the Latin numen....

I shall speak, then, of a unique 'numinous' category of
value and of a definitely 'numinous' state of mind, which is
...perfectly sui generis and irreducible to any other ....

OF
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that a theologian or anthropologist of religion would look to the court's
definition to help her with her own understanding of the term. Legal
interpretations are, to put it another way, interpretations of legal terms.
If Judge Jones had been interpreting the word "science" as that
word appears in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution, which
gives Congress the power to promote the "Progress of Science" by
granting patent rights, then he would have been acting well within his
judicial role. But Judge Jones was not interpreting any legal text when
he decided that ID is not "science." As the Constitution prohibits
promoting religion but says nothing about teaching (or not teaching)
science (or non-science), what exactly was the judge doing when he
decided that ID is not "science"? It seems that he was coming up with
criteria to define what science actually is, writ large, in the real world,
outside the realm of legal text, as though he were a philosopher of
science or, at the very least, some sort of dictionary editor. This is not a
typical judicial undertaking.
Indeed, unlike in the context of
interpretation of legal texts, where techniques and canons have long
existed to guide judges in the interpretive enterprise, it is not even clear
how a judge should go about coming up with a definition of "science," as
[I]t is the emotion of a creature, submerged and
overwhelmed by its own nothingness in contrast to that
which is supreme above all creatures.
(alterations added). For an anthropological definition, see CLIFFORD GEERTZ,
90 (1973):
[A]lthough it is notorious that definitions establish nothing,
in themselves they do, if they are carefully enough
constructed, provide a useful orientation, or reorientation,
of thought, such that an extended unpacking of them can be
an effective way of developing and controlling a novel line
of inquiry. They have the useful virtue of explicitness: they
commit themselves in a way discursive prose, which, in
this field especially, is always liable to substitute rhetoric
for argument, does not. Without further ado, then, a
religion is:
(1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish
powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and
motivations in men by (3) formulating conceptions of a
general order of existence and (4) clothing these
conceptions with such an aura of factuality that (5) the
moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic.
(alterations added).
INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES

THE
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that term exists outside the world of legal texts. As such, the judge's
foray into deciding whether ID constitutes science fell outside the typical
work of the federal judge in our legal system.
D. Judges are not Philosophersof Science
Fourth, and relatedly, we should not expect judges to do a
particularly good job when they attempt to define "science" as a
philosopher of science might. Judges are experts in interpreting
language contained in legal texts, but since they are neither scientists nor
philosophers of science, it is hard to imagine that they would construct a
successful definition of "science," if that term is unmoored to any sort of
legal text. Unlike professional philosophers of science, judges are not
trained in the discipline; are unschooled in the discipline's literature,
history, and methods; and are unlikely to understand the full implications
of their lay decisions 3 9 Does the Kitzmiller opinion demonstrate
otherwise? Did this judge correctly define "science"? Well, for one
thing, it is not even clear what Judge Jones' definition of science actually
39. Just as one example of what becoming a professional philosopher of
science entails, consider this description of a philosophy of science Ph.D. program at
University of Notre Dame:
Those who elect the philosophy track toward the Ph.D. in
history and philosophy of science must satisfy the
following course distribution requirements. In HPS, they
will take a minimum of three courses in the general area of
philosophy of science and four courses in history of
science. In addition, students will satisfy a slightly
modified form of the philosophy -graduate program's
requirements, namely, the philosophy proseminar and a
minimum of one course in each of the following areas:
logic, history of ancient philosophy, history of medieval
philosophy or science, and history of modem philosophy,
and in two of the following three areas: ethics,
metaphysics, and epistemology. Students may also be
advised to take some extra work in one of the sciences, if
this seems necessary for the specialized research they are
planning. The language requirement for Ph.D. candidates in
the philosophy track is a reading knowledge of two foreign
languages.
Reilly Center for Science, Technology, and Values, HPS Graduate Program,
http://www.nd.edu/-hps/hpsdoctoral.html (last visited November 20, 2006).
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is. Does he mean to say, for instance, that any theory which has not
succeeded in the peer review literature is not science? Does he mean to
say that any theory that has been compellingly critiqued, as he clearly
believes Behe's theory of irreducible complexity has been, is likewise
not science? It is not clear at all from his discussion of the issue. But
more importantly, what about the substance of his definition? Is he
pointing to the right criteria generally to determine what constitutes
science? As for that question, I simply do not know. Like the judge, I
am neither a scientist nor a philosopher of science, so I cannot reliably
critique his criteria.
Moreover, I am given great pause from the philosophy of science
that I have read, which suggests that at least some philosophers of
science believe the whole "demarcation" approach-the approach that
sets out criteria to distinguish science from non-science-is itself highly
suspect.4 ° Certainly the judge in Kitzmiller did not seek to justify his
own decision to engage in a demarcation analysis in a way that would
even acknowledge, much less satisfy, the anti-demarcation critique
within the field. Also giving me pause is the very negative reaction from
some philosophers of science which followed the only previous attempt
by a court to set out criteria for demarcating science from non-science in
a case involving evolution. After a district court judge tried defining
science in McLean v. Arkansas in the mid-1980s, 41 defining science
somewhat similarly to how Judge Jones seems to have defined it, one
prominent philosopher of science critiqued the definitions as being
"about as remote from well-founded opinion in the philosophy of science
as Creationism is from respectable geology., 42 Of course, philosophy of
science may have evolved since then, and I do not wish to make any firm
substantive philosophical judgment here about the possibility of

40. See, e.g., LARRY LAUDAN, BEYOND POSITIVISM AND RELATIVISM: THEORY,
METHOD, AND EVIDENCE 211 (1996); PHILIP KITCHER, ABUSING SCIENCE: THE CASE
AGAINST CREATIONISM 40-50 (1982).
See also Wexler, Darwin, Design, and
Disestablishment,supra note 12, at 784 n. 148 (citing additional sources).
41. See McClean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1272 (E.D.
Ark. 1982) (holding unconstitutional an Arkansas statute forbidding the teaching of
evolution in public elementary or secondary schools unless accompanied by
instruction in the theory of "creation science").
42. Larry Laudan, Commentary on Ruse: Science at the Bar-Causesfor

Concern,*in CREATIONISM, SCIENCE,
(Marcel C. La Follette, ed., 1983).

AND THE LAW: THE ARKANSAS CASE

161, 166
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demarcation or the particular criteria relied upon by Judge Jones. My
point is simply that the demarcation enterprise seems to be fraught with
peril and therefore best avoided, particularly when, as in this case, it was
entirely unnecessary.
One counter-argument that could be raised at this point 43 is that
judges often engage in this science vs. non-science demarcation because,
under the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharm, Inc.,4 4 federal judges are required to determine whether
proffered expert scientific testimony is scientifically valid before they
allow it into evidence under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 45
While this is true to some degree, there are several reasons why the
analysis routinely engaged in by federal judges under Rule 702 is
different from and does not justify the type of demarcation analysis that
Judge Jones attempted in Kitzmiller.
First, federal judges have to engage in some sort of "is it
science?" inquiry when considering expert testimony because Rule 702,
which contains the word "scientific," was legislatively enacted and is
thus binding on those judges. This was not true in the ID case, where no
legislative or other text contained the word "science" or "scientific" or
anything of the sort. Second, because the rule established by Daubert is
based on the term "scientific" in Rule 702, the inquiry in which federal
courts engage when they analyze proffered testimony is not whether
some testimony is "scientific" in any philosophical, unmoored sense, but
merely whether that testimony is "scientific" as that word was used by
Congress in that particular rule.
Thus, the Daubert inquiry is
fundamentally different from the inquiry in which Judge Jones engaged.
This leads to the third point, which is that because the Daubert test is

43. Indeed, this counter-argument was raised by Professor Steve Gey from
Florida State University when I presented the argument at the American Association
for the Advancement of Science's annual meeting in St. Louis last February. I thank
Professor Gey for his comments there.
44. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
45. Id. at 589 ("[U]nder the [Federal Rules of Evidence] the trial judge must
ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant,
but reliable." (alterations added)). Rule 702 provides: "If scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise." Fed. R. Evid. 702.
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based on actual statutory language, if Congress believes that courts are
making mistakes in how they understand what makes something
"scientific," it could always amend the rule either by changing the word
or adding a more specific definition. There is no such check on judges in
the ID context, since there, the judges are not interpreting statutory
language.
Fourth, it is not at all clear that Daubert and Rule 702 actually
require judges to distinguish "science" from "non-science," or whether
instead the inquiry under these sources of legal authority simply requires
judges to determine whether something is good science as opposed to
unsuccessful or bad science. If Daubert really requires the latter, then
the inquiry in which federal judges engage would differ significantly
from any Kitzmiller-like attempt to distinguish science from non-science.
At some points in the Kitzmiller opinion the Court talks in terms of a
theory's "scientific validity" rather than whether it constitutes "science"
in any philosophical sense, and certain of the Court's criteria, such as
error rates, peer review, publication, and general acceptance, also seem
to sound in notions of good versus bad science rather than science versus
non-science.
Finally, even if it were true that courts applying Daubert were
performing a demarcation analysis, and thus the premise of the counterargument were true (namely, that courts might as well engage in the
science versus non-science inquiry when analyzing ID, because they do
it all the time anyway), the counter-argument would still only prevail if it
were clear that the Daubert demarcation criteria are sound and that
judges engaging in this inquiry are doing a good job. It is not clear
whether this is the case. Some commentary suggests that the Daubert
criteria are unsound and that the entire practice of applying these criteria
in the federal courts is deeply flawed.4 6
Given the above considerations, any judge who wants to engage
in a demarcation inquiry should first explain why he or she is in fact
competent to define science and to apply that definition. Certainly Judge
Jones did not make this affirmative case before engaging in his own
demarcation analysis.

46. See, e.g., David Crump, The Trouble with Daubert-Kumho: Reconsidering
the Supreme Court's Philosophy ofScience, 68 Mo. L. REv. 1 (2003).
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E. The Judge'sDiscussion Opens the Door to FutureManipulation
Although lawyers and judges may not be very good at
philosophy of science, they are very good at making arguments and
manipulating concepts and terms to suit their needs. As a result, Judge
Jones' decision to set out criteria for distinguishing science from nonscience could have unintended negative consequences for ID opponents.
Once a judge declares that science means "X" and that it is essential to a
finding of unconstitutionality that a purported teaching is not science
(i.e., not "X"), the judge has opened the door in the next case for better
prepared lawyers to argue that in fact such a teaching is "X" and
therefore must be allowed in the public schools.
For instance, could a school district now argue that it must be
allowed to teach "flood geology"--the idea that the earth's geological
characteristics are the result of a relatively recent world-wide flood?
Under Judge Jones' criteria, the answer is not clear. 47 A flood is a
natural, rather than a supernatural explanation, for observable data
(criterion #1), and it is a positive explanation for those data, rather than
simply a critique of evolution, thus perhaps steering clear of the second
and third criteria. And while it is true that flood geology has not met
with success in the scientific community, it is far from clear whether that
is an independent criterion under Judge Jones' analysis (and one can
certainly think of reasons why it should not be 48). Moreover, if one
judge can practice philosophy of science, what is to stop others from
doing the same? Perhaps the next judge to hear an ID case will decide
that science simply means "the process of searching for the best logical
explanations for observed data." In that case, schools might be allowed
to teach not only ID but also perhaps the whole kit and caboodle of

47. Recall these criteria: "(1) ID violates the centuries-old ground rules of
science by invoking and permitting supernatural causation; (2) the argument of
irreducible complexity, central to ID, employs the same flawed and illogical
contrived dualism that doomed creation science in the 1980's; and (3) ID's negative
attacks on evolution have been refuted by the scientific community." Kitzmiller v.
Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 735 (M.D. Pa. 2005). See supra p. 94.
48. For example, if success in the scientific community was a prerequisite for
something to be labeled "science," new ideas that are otherwise sound but that have
not yet been accepted by the community would be denied scientific status. This
could have the effect of unnecessarily stifling scientific progress.
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young earth Creationism. Is this really a can of worms that ID opponents
want to open?
F. The Judge Did Not Explain Why He Addressed the "Is it Science?"
Issue.
Finally, given the many difficulties outlined above, one would
have expected to see a clear, precise, and perhaps extended explanation
of exactly why the judge thought it was necessary to take on the difficult
and controversial question of "what is science?" The opinion in fact
contains no such explanation. It merely states that resolving the question
is "essential" to the court's holding and that it is "incumbent upon the
court" to decide the issue. 49 But the court never explains why it is
incumbent on the court to decide the issue or why resolving the question
is essential. The objection does not go simply to the opinion's clarity,
but also to its substance. If we do not know why it was necessary to ask
whether ID is science, then we do not know what the implications are of
the court's finding that ID is not science.
The opinion's lack of clarity on this score is particularly
unfortunate because it is quite possible that the judge was not attempting
to answer the "is it science?" question from a philosophy of science
perspective. At certain points in the opinion, it appears that Judge Jones
was simply asking whether ID is successful science, not whether it is or
is not science. For example, when he concludes the relevant section of
his analysis, he says not only that ID "is not science," but also that it
"cannot be adjudged a valid, accepted scientific theory, 5 ° which leads to
the possibility that the judge thought that ID may be science after all,
although invalid and non-accepted science. Similarly, sometimes it
seems that the judge might only be making the limited point that ID's
failure to achieve success in the scientific community contributes to the
message of religious endorsement that the school sends by choosing to
teach the theory, in part because no reasonable observer would see ID as
scientific. The opinion states: "It is our view that a reasonable, objective
observer would, after reviewing both the voluminous record in this case,
and our narrative, reach the inescapable conclusion that ID is an

49. Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 716.
50. Id. at 745.
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interesting theological argument, but that it is not science." 5 ' Saying that
the reasonable observer would understand ID as non-scientific is not the
same as making a philosophy of science claim that ID is in fact not
science.
If this were all that Judge Jones meant to express in the opinion,
I would have no problem with his analysis. But although this might have
been the judge's intent, the language of the opinion quite strongly
suggests he was instead making a conclusion, sounding in philosophy of
science, that ID is in fact not science. He reiterates this "not science"
52
language at least seven times.
Given that he says this over and over,
there is little choice but to assume that the judge intended to make a
larger, more philosophically-oriented claim beyond merely that ID is
unsuccessful science or that its failure among the scientific community
strengthens its religious endorsement message. Surely, lawyers or other
judges trying to follow the opinion in the future would not be acting
unreasonably in assuming that the53 "ID is not science" finding was
"essential" to the opinion's holding.
The judge does offer one practical explanation for addressing the
issue, namely that he presided over days and days of specific testimony
on the issue and wanted to save other courts and judges the time and
trouble of reconsidering the same evidence. "[W]e will offer our
conclusion on whether ID is science," the judge wrote, "in the hope that
it may prevent the obvious waste of judicial.., resources which would
54
be occasioned by a subsequent trial involving [this] precise question.,
But this argument begs the question of why, as a legal matter, anybody
would have to consider the evidence, at least as it relates to the question
of "is ID science?" If there is no coherent answer, then Judge Jones'
explanation that consideration of the science issue will be useful to other
courts likewise falters.
Of course, saying that the judge should not have resolved the
issue is not the same thing as saying that the litigators should not have
raised it. In their complaint, the plaintiffs argued that ID
is neither scientific nor a theory in the scientific
sense; it is an inherently religious argument or
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 745-46.
Id.at 717, 735, 737, 738, 742, 745, and 764.
See supra text accompanying note 49.
Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 735 (alterations added).
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assertion that falls outside the realm of science ....
The effect [of the policy] will be to compel public
school science teachers to present to their students
in biology class information that is inherently
religious, not scientific, in nature.5 5
Although I disagree with the apparent assumption here-that
something is either science or religion, and that the judge must decide
which one includes ID-I certainly do not fault the plaintiffs for making
this argument. At the very least, calling ID non-science certainly has a
strong rhetorical appeal. Moreover, the plaintiffs had no idea how the
judge would approach the case. As lawyers representing their clients,
they were surely justified in making any reasonable argument that would
further their case. As the judge's decision proves, the plaintiffs made the
right strategic choice-but litigating a case is not the same as deciding
it. 56 The judge surely did not have to decide the issue simply because the
plaintiffs asked him to do so. Unlike the litigants, the judge had the
responsibility to consider whether making a science vs. non-science
determination was necessary and advisable, given all the circumstances.
For all the reasons outlined above, the judge should have declined the
invitation to opine on the issue and should have decided the case on the
grounds that the policy endorsed religion, pure and simple.
CONCLUSION

It is understandably easy to celebrate when a court reaches a
decision that comports with one's own view of a controversial issue.
When I argue that ID opponents should be skeptical about Judge Jones'
decision that ID is not science, I do so with some hesitation. After all,
the judge's decision on this score will likely have the effect of

55. Complaint, Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 3-4, available at

http://www2.ncseweb.org/kvd/all_legal/2004-12-14_Kitzmiller-vDASD_
Complaint readable.pdf. The defendants, of course, argued the other way. See
Answer, Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist. 5-6, available at
http://www2.ncseweb.org/kvd/all_legal/2005-01-03_Defense Answer-to_
Complaint.pdf ("Intelligent Design is a scientific theory based on interpretation of
scientific data by scientists; it is endorsed by a growing number of scientists who
assert that intelligent causes are necessary to explain the complex, information-rich
structures observed by biologists.").

56. Or writing a law review article about it.
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discouraging some (perhaps many) school districts from adopting ID
policies in the future. As a policy matter, I think this is a good result.
But judges are neither legislators nor school boards, and their opinions,
to the extent they are precedential or persuasive to other courts, can carry
unintended and unwanted consequences. My concern is that, by
aggrandizing the power to define science, the judicial system could
infringe on the scientific community's rightful authority over the
boundary between science and non-science. By weakening the scientific
community's authority in this way, the legal system not only undermines
science, but also possibly threatens religious freedom as well. Consider
the consequences if a future court, acting under the power established in
Kitzmiller, were to define science so broadly that schools would be
allowed to teach flood geology, creation science, or other theories that
clearly endorse religion. Nonbelievers in those science classes would be
forced to study and learn those concepts as truth, simply because a judge
has declared them to be scientific. Today's victory can easily become
tomorrow's defeat. ID opponents would be wise to downplay this
controversial portion of the Kitzmiller decision and to protect vigilantly
against its future abuse.

